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The Normative and the Transformative in Ferrara’s Exemplary Politics 
 
 
In The Democratic Horizon, Alessandro Ferrara deepens his project of developing a post-
foundational conception of political normativity built on his conceptions of exemplarity, 
authenticity and judgment.
 1
 He seeks to redeem what he sees as the unique promise of Rawls’s 
political liberalism in helping democratic theory rise to a series of critical contemporary challenges 
by subjecting it to a hermeneutic and conjectural turn. Theorists who have emphasized the 
significance of political judgment, whether inspired by a realist sense of or, like Ferrara, by the 
conception of reflective judgment in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment (and by Hannah 
Arendt’s influential political interpretation of this) have tended to be skeptical about the kind of 
political liberalism. On the face of it, the gap between Rawlsian political liberalism and the 
judgment paradigm seems ominous. The former seems to offer a set of theoretical constraints on 
legitimate political action which must be applied to political practice. The latter seems to reject a 
priori theoretical constraints in favour of the primacy of practice in determining how we orient 
ourselves to particular concrete political situations. In part, the boldness and originality of this 
important book lies in its attempt to bridge this chasm. This article traces a very narrow path 
through Ferrara’s rich and wide-ranging discussion to suggest some difficulties with this bridging 
project. 
Ferrara has been at the forefront of what we can think of as the strong programme for 
political judgment to political theory. This breaks with weaker views of judgment that restrict it to 
the formation of belief or envisage it is merely a necessary supplement to the broader principles or 
                                                                    
1 Ferrara 1998, 1999, 2004, 2008. 
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rules.
2
 For these theorists, general principles cannot or should not provide guide rails for political 
judgment, which instead has a more autonomous status as a means by which agents guide, orient 
and shape their action in political contexts. He shares with realist proponents of political judgment 
an appreciation of the distinctive character of the political (informed not only in his case by Rawls’s 
conception of political liberalism but by engagement with wider literatures in political science, 
including, governance theory) and the contextual character of political judgment. Yet he shies away 
from the radically contextual view of political judgment espoused by realists such as Raymond 
Geuss in favour of a conception of judgment that is meant to support a particular view of ideal 
liberal political theory.
3
 Ferrara’s project is more intimately related to the strand of thinking about 
political judgment inspired by Kant’s Critique of Judgment, from which core notions of reflective 
judgment, exemplarity and sensus communis derive, and which was given an influential political 
elaboration by Hannah Arendt.
4
 For this approach, political judgment combines the appraisal of 
concrete situations with a context-transcending claim to validity. The Arendtian approach shares 
some features with Rawls’s political liberalism, notably a view that inherited moral criteria no 
longer provide an authoritative framework for political decision-making, an emphasis on 
accommodating a plurality of perspectives and the expulsion of truth as a standard in political 
evaluation. However, its proponents also distinguish themselves quite insistently from what is seen 
as excessively principle-centred and unpolitical conception of political theory (cf. Honig 1993, 
Zerilli 2012). 
                                                                    
2
 “For a concept of understanding, which contains the general rule, must be supplemented by an act 
of judgment whereby the practitioner distinguishes instance where the rule applies from whose 
where it does not. And since rules cannot be in turn provided on every occasion to direct the 
judgment in subsuming each instance under a previous rule (for that would involve an infinite 
regress), theoreticians will be found who can never in all their lives become practical, since they 
lack judgment” (Kant 1793: 61). 
3 Bourke and Geuss 2009, Philp 2010, Geuss 2010, Geuss 2015. 
4
 Kant 1790, Arendt 1982. See Azmanova 2012, Beiner 1982, Norval 2008, Zerilli 2005, 2012. 
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In aligning his project with Rawlsian political liberalism, Ferrara stands out from, and 
challenges, these alternative views of the judgment paradigm. Before examining the machinery of 
Ferrara’s account, we need to set it in the context of some of the key features of Rawlsian political 
liberalism. For this account, modern democratic societies are characterized by “the fact of 
reasonable pluralism”: that is, their members possess “comprehensive doctrines” (moral, religious, 
philosophical) which are both incompatible and reasonable. The inevitability of reasonable 
disagreement about moral, religious and philosophical issues flows from what Rawls dubs “the 
burdens of judgment”, the differences in experience and limits on human thought and knowledge 
that lead different individuals through the free exercise of reason to arrive at different reasonable 
conclusions. In order to provide a form of liberalism that does not require the imposition of 
controversial moral, religious or philosophical views on citizens who reasonably disagree with 
them, Rawls rejects a view of liberalism grounded in comprehensive doctrine (such as he finds in 
Kant and John Stuart Mill) in favour of a “freestanding” political conception with its own sort of 
political justification. Unlike a comprehensive doctrine, this conception does not aspire to be true 
but rather to be acceptable to all reasonable citizens and endorsed by all reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines in an overlapping consensus. This can then form the basis of informed and willing 
agreement among citizens viewed as free and equal persons, for Rawls.  
Rawls views this conception of liberalism as having a particular kind of normativity. As he 
puts in a well-known earlier formulation, “what justifies a conception of justice is not its being true 
to an order antecedent to and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding of 
ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the traditions 
embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us” (Rawls 1999: 306).The 
normative standard of correctness for this conception is not truth but reasonableness. The burden 
that Ferrara takes up from Rawlsian political liberalism is to provide an account of this particular 
political conception of objectivity with the resources of the judgment paradigm. Ferrara’s account 
of the sources of political normativity seeks to offer an alternative account of “the normative hold 
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that the most reasonable argument in a public reason controversy exerts on us” (Ferrara 2004: 588), 
which opens up some different ways of thinking about the character and scope of political 
liberalism. As he puts it, 
the normativity that can bind us in a democratic horizon marked by pluralism 
is the normativity of what is reasonable for us, where what is reasonable for 
us cannot be determined independently of who we want to be […] without at 
that very moment collapsing the specificity of public reason into some form 
of theoretical or practical reason. (Ferrara 2014: 219) 
Ferrara eschews the justification of criteria for this with reference to pre-political principles. At the 
same time, the emphasis on what is “reasonable for us” is not intended to move political liberalism 
in a relativist direction, grounding it merely as the expression of a communal sense of identity: who 
“we” are and what such an identity consists in are not taken as fixed. Nor does Ferrara think we 
insouciantly dismiss the question of the sources of this political normativity as in any case irrelevant 
to, or fully addressed by, an assertion of what we choose to do around here, as in Richard Rorty’s 
“ethnocentric” conception of political liberalism (Rorty 1991; cf. Festenstein 2001). Instead, Ferrara 
draws on the Kantian concepts of reflective judgment and exemplarity in order to delineate the 
distinct normative character of our democratic horizon. 
Reflective judgment involves the appraisal of a concrete particular as a particular, without 
subsuming it under a more general category. When I judge an object to be beautiful, on this 
account, I make a particular appraisal of this object, which is not a matter of subsuming it under the 
concept of beauty. However, this judgment also makes a claim to universal validity or 
communicability: the aesthetic judgment is “exemplary … because everyone ought to give the 
object in question his approval and follow suit in finding it beautiful” (Kant 1790: s. 19). Judgments 
of taste exact agreement from everyone, and appeal to a common capacity to apprehend beauty 
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(“sensus communis”). In claiming this kind of normativity for the Rawlsian category of the “most 
reasonable”, Ferrara fleshes out the conception of exemplarity at work. 
For Ferrara the normativity of the reasonable consists in the exemplary character of a policy, 
institution, statute, a judicial verdict, which is disclosed through the art of judgment.
5
 Exemplarity 
in his sense has four important aspects. First, it consists in the congruence of the exemplar with the 
collective or shared identity of those for whom it has normative force. This claim to exemplarity is 
not a claim that this policy is congruent with just how we think we are now but with “our shared 
sense of who we could be at our best” (Ferrara 2004: 593). So the exemplarity of political 
liberalism consists in its “congruence with a concrete modern identity premised on the notion of 
fairness and equal respect among free and equal citizens” (Ferrara 2004: 593). A claim to be the 
most reasonable is a claim that a policy or institution commands our consent because it fits in the 
most exemplary way with this shared sense of who we are at our best. Second, exemplarity also 
consists in a policy or institution’s itself having what is referred to as “exceptional self-
congruency”, a “law unto itself”, expressive of a particular moral tradition but not confined to it 
(Ferrara 2014: 64; Ferrara 2008b: 78). The normative force of an exemplary policy or institution 
follows from its being a part of and cohering with the “singular normativity of a symbolic whole” 
(Ferrara 2014: 65; Ferrara 2004: 590). Third, exemplarity has an affective component and “sets the 
public imagination in motion”.6 Fourth, exemplarity is context-transcending. The claim for 
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 “Given our shared commitment to p, we are shown by the most reasonable argument that we can't 
but commit ourselves to q as well. [...] The nature of this new commitment is best highlighted not 
by normativity associated with the application of principles to facts of the matter, but rather the 
normativity of reflective judgment, understood as judgment in the service of the fulfillment of an 
identity” (Ferrara 2008: 72-73). 
 
6
 “Democracy cannot afford leaving political imagination theoretically unattended. The suggestion 
has been put forward to understand democratic politics at its best – that is, when it brings existing 
normative principles and practices on the ground into an exemplary congruence or when through 
exemplary practices it articulates new normative standards and political values – as a way of 
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exemplarity derives its validity from an appeal to a sensus communis and a concept of the 
furtherance of life that should be viewed as a universal capacity to sense what promotes human 
flourishing. Exemplarity is linked with a Kantian feeling of the promotion or furtherance of life, 
which Ferrara glosses as the extension of the range of possibilities of our political life. 
Just as reflective judgment is the capacity to understand beauty in the aesthetic realm, this 
exemplary normativity of the most reasonable for the political normativity is disclosed through the 
reflective workings of judgment. Exemplary normativity, then, is offered as a way of accounting for 
the distinctive normative force of the “most reasonable” institution, policy, constitution, 
constitutional amendment, statute, verdict, a Supreme Court opinion and so on. For the exemplary 
policy, institution, statute, a judicial verdict or conception of justice to possess exemplarity in this 
sense and so to exert this normative force requires that we possess and exercise a capacity of 
judgment that allows us to engage with exemplarity. The work of art can disclose new ways of 
experiencing the world, which our faculty of judgment can both grasp and project as shareable by 
others.  
Ferrara claims is that political liberalism is “uniquely open” to the dimension of exemplary 
normativity (Ferrara 2004: 582). Of course, he can’t offer a derivation from higher-order principles 
of this claim without breaching his own methodological self-denying ordinance, violating his 
conception of the character of political validity. And he concedes that there are other ways of 
interpreting this notion of exemplarity for the political domain.
7
 It does so because it uniquely 
expresses “the art of judgment” in a political context. The constraints of judgment make it a 
centrifugal for Rawls, pulling us in the direction of different irreconcileable reasonable conceptions 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
promoting the public priority of certain ends through good reasons that set the political imagination 
in motion” (Ferrara 2014: 212; cf. Ferrara 2008: 79). 
7
 “The Rawlsian view of the reasonable is one of several possible ways of exporting this view of 
normativity into the political” (Ferrara 2008: 78). 
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of the good, but limits of time and capacity make it centripetal for Ferrara where we require “a 
solution within a temporal frame that it is not up to the deliberators to extend at their will”: 
This gap is bridged by judgment not by way of limiting the pluralism of the 
alternative positions assessed in discourse, but by way of harnessing politics 
to the reasonable, namely, to the area of overlap where what is shared can be 
found. The art of judgment is the art of extending as far as possible this area 
of overlap while continuing to keep the normative relevance of what lies 
within the area of overlapping consensus still undiminishedly capable of 
exemplarily reflecting the superordinate identity, which includes the 
conflicting parties...This exemplary relation between what is shared and 
who we are, which constitutes the only source from which the reasonable 
draws its distinctive normative force once we distinguish public reason from 
practical reason, provides the basis for everyone – no matter whether 
concurring or dissenting, majority or minority – to accept the full legitimacy 
of a politically binding, yet nonunanimous, decision. Once again, the 
normative force of exemplarity presupposes the capacity of our imagination 
to represent what is not immediately in front of us and to foster an enlarged 
mentality. (Ferrara 2014: 33-4) 
This views political argument as primarily organized around the search for the most exemplary 
resolution, in the form of shareable reasons. (“Primarily” because it is an important part of Ferrara’s 
modification of Rawls that he wants to make space for a different mode of “conjectural” reasoning 
on the part of non-liberal views but I won’t discuss this here.) This process is meant to have an 
ordering effect, ranking and prioritizing different values and to be binding on participants.  
The concern I want to focus on is whether exemplary judgment understood in this way is 
able both to furnish the source of normativity that Ferrara attributes to it while sticking to the 
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commitments of Rawlsian political liberalism. It would seem to be not just any judgment that can 
disclose the reasonableness of a policy but only the judgment of a reasonable person. In this 
context, it seems to mean someone who is in fact using her imagination to foster an enlarged 
mentality, reflecting on our superordinate identity, and seeking overlap with other citizens. Viewed 
this way, civic political judgment seems to require certain important conditions. These include, for 
example, trustworthy testimony in order to ensure a well-grounded basis for judgment and a space 
for challenge and to offer reasons.
8
 More problematically, it seems to require certain civic virtues, 
including a commitment to enlarging one’s imagination and affective instincts. What is potentially 
difficult about this for the Rawlsian political liberalism is not the bare fact that some civic virtues 
are required by this conception of judgment, since there is nothing in either conception that 
precludes it from being normatively demanding. Rather, it is the thought that the virtues required by 
this specific conception of judgment come trailing contentious philosophical and ethical 
commitments that are meant ex ante to be excluded from the domain of the political. The vision of 
exemplarity brings together emotion, imagination and reasons in a certain way, suggesting, for 
example, that our affective responses and imaginative projections are subject to scrutiny in the 
space of reasons (Ferrara 2014: 213). However well justified this is, this seems to be the kind of 
controversial claim with respect to different reasonable conceptions of the good that Rawlsian 
public reason is meant to exclude. 
Now Ferrara could respond to the effect that there is no commitment to simple-minded 
agreement on his conceptions of judgment and exemplarity. (Rawls in his late work recognized that 
the burdens of judgment make agreement on justice as fairness or any single set of liberal principles 
unrealistic (Rawls 1999: 582-3).) However, this does not seem to meet the challenge, which asks 
how his model of judgment and exemplarity could reasonably be accepted by free and equal 
persons while (for example) the Aristotelian conception of emotion cannot. To the extent that the 
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 Cf. Festenstein 2009. 
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model of judgment and exemplarity shares premises and arguments with comprehensive 
conceptions of the good, which are meant to be ruled out, it would seem to be in the same boat. 
Ferrara does not seem to have given us the material to show why a distinction should be drawn 
between his own model and the rejected comprehensive ideas.  
This tension emerges in Ferrara’s distinctive and important discussion of the idea of 
democratic openness. Exemplary normativity plays an important role in Ferrara’s conception of 
democratic politics “at its best”, particularly transformative politics, and his linked conception of a 
democratic ethos. Politics is capable of “disclosing a new political world for us”, expanding our 
sense of the possibilities of political life (Ferrara 2014: 37-8, 64).
9
 Here Ferrara offers a general 
characterization of politics at its best – the prioritization of ends on the basis of good reasons that 
move our imagination. Political innovation, he argues, draws on a “fundamental source – 
exemplarity and its force, which proceeds from the radical self-congruence of an identity and 
appears to reconcile ‘is’ and ‘ought’, ‘facts’ and ‘norms’.” (Ferrara 2014: 38). Like the work of art, 
so the outstanding political deed arouses a sense of “enhancement of life”, the enriching and 
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 “All the important junctures where something new has emerged in politics and has transformed 
the world … were junctures where what is new never prevailed by virtue of its following logically 
from what already existed, but rather by virtue of its conveying a new vista on the world we share 
and highlighting some hitherto unnoticed potentialities of it. Like the work of art, so the outstanding 
political deed arouses a sense of ‘enhancement of life’, the enriching and enhancement of a life 
lived in common, and commands our consent by virtue of its exemplary ability to reconcile what 
exists and what we value” (Ferrara 2014: 38). 
“[A]ll truly transformative moments when new ideas have emerged in politics – from natural rights, 
through consensus of the governed as the ground of the government’s legitimacy, through the 
abolition of slavery and later universal suffrage, all the way to social rights, gender equality and 
human rights – new forms never prevailed by virtue of their satisfying antecedently established 
principles, but rather by virtue of their disclosing new perspectives on the world shared in common” 
(Ferrara 2014: 64). 
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enhancement of a life lived in common, and commands our consent by virtue of its exemplary 
ability to reconcile what exists and what we value. 
This creative expansion of our identity is supported in democratic politics by a particular 
ethos that Ferrara calls a passion for openness: “we can understand ‘openness’ as the property of 
those elements that set the imagination in motion, create a space of possibilities, allow for the space 
of reasons (and of judgment) to work and constitute a standard of political desirability” (Ferrara 
2014: 65). This is understood as an attitude of receptivity to the new, in favour of exploring new 
possibilities of political life, promoting a public culture that fosters unconventional solutions, and a 
condition of cognitive receptivity, the preparedness to be self-critical (Ferrara 2014: 14, 48, 214). 
Although it cannot expected to be in operation all the time, democratic politics at its best is a 
standard for our normative understanding of democracy, equally distinct both from routine politics 
– politics as “the science and art of political government” and as “the conducting of political 
affairs” – that we experience during most of our political lives and from populist mobilization. This 
conception of openness is familiar from the kind of liberalism articulated by Mill and Dewey, who, 
as have seen, are usually viewed by political liberals as  “comprehensive” liberals whose conception 
of political value rests on a particular controversial moral account and therefore falls beyond the 
pale of the freestanding political doctrine. We see this contrast in Ferrara’s searching criticisms of 
other recent attempts to articulate a democratic ethos, particularly agape (as it appears in the work 
of Charles Taylor), hospitality (Jacques Derrida) and presumptive generosity (William Connolly 
and Stephen White). These approaches share with Ferrara the aim of cultivating a more generous 
and less anxious form of engagement with difference in a “hyperpluralist” milieu where differences 
are often perceived as alien and threatening. However, these are all said to be “comprehensive” 
moral notions as opposed to the “specifically political” disposition of openness (Ferrara 2014: 62). 
For Ferrara, the link between democratic openness and political liberalism seems to be 
something like this. An ethos of openness is part of any reasonable conception of political value, 
and, in this sense, is part of a citizen’s possessing and exercising the capacity of reflective judgment 
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in a reasonable way. At the societal level, the ethos of openness allows and promotes any 
reasonable “great transformation” and so can be integrated in a modular way into a variety of 
reasonable comprehensive conceptions. Yet to say that any reasonable person must be moved by a 
passion for openness defines the scope of reasonableness in a rather peculiar way. On the face of it, 
the motivation for political liberalism is that there are reasonable citizens who are not moved by this 
passion and reasonable political doctrines that are not include it. But if the claim is only that 
reasonable doctrines must tolerate this passion in others that seems to fall short of Ferrara’s vision 
of a democratic society: it would allow for a society entirely composed of citizens who subscribe to 
mere tolerance of openness. But this is exactly what Ferrara wants to avoid, although it seems quite 
compatible with Rawlsian political liberalism.  
 Outlining these tensions between what Ferrara hopes to achieve with the judgment approach 
and his loyalty to Rawlsian political liberalism only throws a spotlight on a small aspect of 
Ferrara’s wider study, of course, but it is an aspect with wider resonances. For driving the 
adherence to Rawls is a sense that only the principles of this political liberalism can minimize 
oppression in a hyperpluralist society. Yet it is this kind of theoretical guarantee on behalf of 
underpinning principles that the strong judgment model rejects.  
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